The Evolutionary Origins of Human Generosity by Komter, Aafke
  
 University of Groningen






IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2010
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Komter, A. (2010). The Evolutionary Origins of Human Generosity. International Sociology, 25(3), 1-22.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580909360301
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the





The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0268580909360301
 2010 25: 443International Sociology
Aafke Komter








 International Sociological Association





 http://iss.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 







 What is This?
 
- Apr 29, 2010Version of Record >> 
 at University of Groningen on July 4, 2012iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
International Sociology ✦ May 2010 ✦ Vol. 25(3): 443–464
© The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permissions: www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI:  10.1177/0268580909360301 




abstract: This article examines how altruism and self-interest are linked in human 
generosity, and what social scientists can learn from this linkage. The origins of 
generosity are explored by combining biological, psychological, anthropological 
and sociological evidence. Kinship altruism, reciprocal altruism, ‘strong reciprocity’, 
cultural norms and gene-culture co-evolution prove to be major explanations of 
the evolution of cooperation in human beings. Empirical research shows that 
human generosity is selective: kin and close relatives are favoured over others. 
Moreover, generosity generates its own rewards and is therefore again selective: 
the more you give, the more you receive. The selectivity of generosity reveals its 
evolutionary origins.
keywords: altruism ✦ evolution ✦ generosity ✦ kinship ✦ reciprocity
Kindness towards one’s kin is viewed as a genetic investment, a way of 
spreading genes similar to one’s own. Assisting kin thus comes close to 
helping oneself. (De Waal, 2001: 317)
Human generosity is commonly understood as doing good to other people 
or contributing to the society’s common good. Altruism, solidarity, charity 
and gift giving are related terms that come to mind when thinking about 
generosity. The common underlying assumption seems to be that human 
generosity is a beneficial act that may be directed towards other human 
beings, the community or the society as such.
An important branch of social scientific literature on human generosity 
has focused on the practice of gift exchange (for an overview, see Komter, 
2005). In view of the predominantly positive moral connotations embodied 
in common sense notions of the concept of generosity, Marcel Mauss’s 
claim that ‘generosity and self-interest are linked in giving’ (Mauss, 1990 
[1923]: 68) is an interesting one. Although Mauss’s contribution as the 
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founder of the theory of human gift giving and generosity is generally 
uncontested, his ideas about the role of self-interest in human generosity 
have not gone undisputed among contemporary scholars of human gen-
erosity. Especially in the literature on the gift inspired by French philosophy, 
the notion that generous behaviour can serve some interest tends to be 
resisted or downplayed. ‘Real’ gifts are assumed to be truly generous and 
are, or should be, ‘unspoiled’ by expectations or acts of reciprocity 
(e.g. Derrida, 1991). According to the American philosopher Alan Schrift 
(1997: 19), ‘a narrowly self-interested notion of reciprocal return’ has come 
to dominate the current discourse on generosity. Prominent gift scholars 
such as Alain Caillé (2000, 2005) and Jacques Godbout (1992) argue that 
calculation and reciprocity are not central to the gift; their work focuses 
on the altruistic and socially beneficial aspects of the gift.
A closer look into the origins of human generosity might reveal a more 
differentiated picture. Work from biologists and primatologists has dem-
onstrated that generosity is not restricted to human beings but is also 
observed among both higher and lower animal species. Forms of coopera-
tion have been observed between kin-related animals, but also between 
non-related individuals. Biologists have pointed at the significance of this 
phenomenon for the maintenance and further evolution of the species, and 
have developed concepts such as kinship altruism and reciprocal altruism 
to explain animal and human generosity and cooperation.
This article aims to explore what Mauss had in mind when he wrote the 
sentence quoted above, and what contemporary social scientists can learn 
from it. If it can be shown that generosity maintains some core interest of 
both the giver and the recipient, then it becomes possible to understand 
why generosity and self- or group interest are not mutually exclusive. If 
this is indeed the case, this seemingly contradictory insight and the impli-
cations it has for a proper understanding of human social behaviour should 
be incorporated within contemporary social theory.
My terminological focus on the concept of generosity ties in nicely with the 
way the concept of ‘cooperation’ has mostly been used in the biological litera-
ture, namely to indicate behaviour which is costly for the cooperator, while 
providing a benefit to the recipient (e.g. Nowak, 2006); in a similar vein, social 
scientists Mauss and Simmel have considered gift giving as being a sacrifice 
for a gain. Where the original literature refers to cooperation I do the same, 
whereas my own conclusions are drawn in terms of generosity.
In this article the origins of human generosity are explored by combining 
insights from (experimental) biology, primatology, psychology, anthro-
pology and sociology. One important cautionary remark is in order here. 
Since the appearance of foundational works such as those of Hamilton 
(1964), Axelrod (1984) and Trivers (1971), the issue of animal and human 
cooperation and generosity has generated a vast and impressive body of 
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research, in particular in the fields of experimental biology and game 
theory. Since the 1980s, enormous scientific progress has been made in 
these disciplines, and a much more differentiated theoretical understanding 
has come into existence. It is beyond my competence as a social scientist, 
and therefore beyond the scope of this article, to attempt to provide a full 
overview or an in-depth assessment of this literature. My main aim is to 
familiarize social scientists with some of the core insights gained from 
these disciplines, and point out some striking continuities with findings 
in the field of social science.
Generosity in Games and Experiments
In trying to explain altruism, evolution theory has been facing a funda-
mental paradox: if natural selection, by being inherently selfish, promotes 
adaptations that primarily serve the individual, how can altruism and 
cooperation be explained? Why should an individual increase the fitness 
of another individual when it goes at the cost of its own? Although Darwin 
proposed various solutions for the problem of altruism, the theory of evo-
lution with its focus on the struggle for life and competition for survival 
has dismissed cooperative phenomena for a long time (see Ridley, 1998). 
The revitalization of Darwin’s attempts to understand altruism can for an 
important part be attributed to game-theoretical simulations of cooperation 
(e.g. Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1964; Trivers, 1971).
Kinship Altruism and Reciprocal Altruism
Since the 1960s and early 1970s evolution theory has acquired two kinds 
of extensions: the theory of genetic kinship altruism and the theory of 
reciprocal altruism. The first theory stipulates that by helping one’s rela-
tives one contributes to spreading one’s own genes – which is supposed 
to increase survival chances – whereas the second theory allows for the 
explanation of altruistic behaviour among genetically non-related indi-
viduals of the same species or even among members of different species. 
William Hamilton was the first to mathematically model the genetic evo-
lution of social behaviour. He argued that sacrifices involved in parental 
care can maximize the ‘inclusive fitness’ of the organisms involved because 
more adult offspring are left as a result; this way, the genes causing its 
possessor to give parental care will leave more replica genes in the next 
generation than genes having the opposite tendency (Hamilton, 1964). 
Whereas Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness explains cooperation 
between close relatives, the question why unrelated organisms cooperate 
was still left unanswered. Using a formal cost–benefit approach, biologist 
Robert Trivers (1971) developed the theory of reciprocal altruism. This 
theory extends beyond genetically related organisms and argues that 
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returning favours to unrelated individuals can also serve survival goals. 
The core idea of the theory of reciprocal altruism is that providing benefits 
to other individuals leads to direct or indirect (through third parties) 
reciprocation, which serves the survival chances of all parties involved.
Since the 1970s, a firm tradition of empirical research inspired by game 
theory has been established, and hypotheses derived from the theory of 
reciprocal altruism have been tested in various ways. A crucial unanswered 
question was how, in cases of interaction between non-genetically related 
individuals, an evolutionary trend to cooperative behaviour could ever 
have started in the first place; a next question concerns the maintenance 
of cooperation: why would it serve you to continue cooperation if it is not 
certain that your generous input will be rewarded?
Direct and Indirect Reciprocity
Reciprocal altruism involves both direct and indirect reciprocity. In direct 
reciprocity there are repeated encounters between the same two individuals: 
‘my behaviour depends on what you have done to me. Indirect reciprocity 
means that there are repeated encounters within a group; my behaviour 
depends on what you have done to others’ (Dreber et al., 2008: 348).
Departing from the assumption that interactions between pairs of indi-
viduals occur on a probabilistic basis, political scientist Axelrod and biologist 
Hamilton (1981) use an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and a computer tour-
nament to demonstrate how cooperation can emerge from a previously 
asocial state, and how it is maintained once established. Tit-for-tat, or 
responding to the other player’s action in an identical way, proves to be 
an evolutionary robust strategy: it gradually replaces all other strategies 
in a simulation of a great variety of decision rules. Moreover, if the inter-
actions between non-related individuals have a sufficiently large proba-
bility of continuing, tit-for-tat is evolutionary stable, that is, it is maintained 
over time. ‘Thus cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in a 
predominantly noncooperative world, can thrive in a variegated environ-
ment, and can defend itself once fully established’ (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981: 1395).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has often been based on a two-player matrix. 
If the standard game is played only once, the evolutionary best strategy 
for both players is to defect but if the play is repeated, it usually leads to 
cooperative solutions (Wedekind, 1998). In Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
with multiple players, solutions are often less cooperative. Whereas direct 
reciprocity is assumed to promote the evolution of generosity in dyads or 
in small groups, the fact that human beings also cooperate in large groups 
of unrelated individuals poses a problem (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 
2005). In real-life interactions between human beings direct reciprocity as 
captured in the principle ‘You scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours’ is 
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widespread. But how can we make sense of the phenomenon of indirect 
reciprocity that is also frequently observed: ‘You scratch my back and I’ll 
scratch someone else’s’ (or ‘I scratch your back and someone else will 
scratch mine’)? Nowak and Sigmund (1998) have done game simulations 
to understand the evolution of indirect reciprocity by postulating that it 
involves reputation building and moral norms which – in their turn – foster 
generosity. Nowak and Sigmund’s assumption is that individuals gain 
social status in the group by helping others. Indirect reciprocity can 
evolve if the other group members base their future actions on this infor-
mation. Having observed whether a player gave help or not significantly 
influences one’s own giving or withholding help. Being observed giving 
something to another person increases your social status, whereas with-
holding your gift decreases it. Social status, according to Nowak and 
Sigmund, makes cooperation on a larger scale possible and binds larger 
groups of individuals together.
Experimental psychological research on the role of ‘competitive altruism’ 
shows similar results: in a reputation environment when contributions 
are public, people are more altruistic. Selective benefits are apparently 
associated with altruistic behaviour for reputation reasons (Hardy and 
van Vugt, 2006). Competitive (public) altruism can account for coopera-
tion in large groups because it serves as a ‘signal’ that people are poten-
tially interesting exchange partners (van Vugt et al., 2007). Hardy and van 
Vugt (2006) argue that competitive altruism may be widespread in human 
societies; as examples they mention public displays of generosity – called 
potlatch – as they have been documented by anthropologists (e.g. Malinowski, 
1922; Mauss, 1990 [1923]). Similarly, social psychological literature shows 
that an increase in the visibility and a decrease in the anonymity of indi-
viduals enhances their cooperation in social dilemmas. However, while 
competition, reputation and visibility may be important forces accounting 
for human generosity and cooperation, not all individuals are cooperative 
to the same extent; experiments demonstrate the existence of different 
reciprocal types, of which some are more inclined to cooperate while 
others tend more towards competition or free-riding (Kurzban and Houser, 
2005; van Vugt and van Lange, 2006).
The conditions under which public displays of generosity lead to repu-
tation formation have been varied in a number of empirical studies (e.g. Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003; Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind and 
Milinski, 2000) but the results remain essentially the same: the receivers’ his-
tory of giving has a significant impact on the donors’ decision (not) to 
give. According to these researchers indirect reciprocity is one of the major 
evolutionary concepts to explain generous behaviour in small groups. 
Although generous players may not be aware of the self-interested and 
strategic element in their behaviour, generosity in indirect reciprocity can 
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only evolve if it eventually leads to a net benefit in the long run, and having 
a good reputation significantly helps to achieve that benefit. Thus, if giv-
ing something to other people pays off in the long run because in future 
interactions these people will take your social status into account, giving 
can be regarded more as an investment into one’s own future than as a 
real altruistic act (Wedekind, 1998).
Dugatkin and his colleagues (e.g. Dugatkin and Mesterton-Gibbons, 
1996) have argued that the importance of reciprocity for both animal and 
human cooperation should not be overstated, and suggest additional 
explanations, for instance mutualism. Whereas reciprocal altruism extends 
cooperation into the future by being based on score-keeping, mutualism 
operates in the present, but only indirectly, through feedback from the 
environment: non-cooperation rebounds against the actor. Among pri-
mates the evidence for reciprocity is indeed scarce, according to some 
biologists. One explanation might be the complexity of the mental 
machinery involved in non-trivial examples of reciprocity, such as the 
capacity to classify other individuals’ actions as cooperative, intentionally 
uncooperative or unintentionally uncooperative (Hammerstein, 2003). As 
Stevens and Stephens (2002) have demonstrated in their game-theoretical 
model, mutualistic explanations instead of the more complex mechanisms 
of kinship altruism or reciprocal altruism, can account for behaviour such 
as food sharing.
‘Strong Reciprocity’ and Cultural Forces
Whereas kinship altruism and direct and indirect reciprocity may 
explain cooperation in families and among friends, cooperation in larger 
groups of strangers whom one may only meet once, requires different 
types of explanation. As Nowak (2006) has shown, several other mecha-
nisms may be involved here, for instance network reciprocity, in which 
cooperators form network clusters where they help each other, and 
group selection, which involves between-group competition; groups of 
cooperators will grow faster than pure defector groups, and will there-
fore be selected.
Fehr and his colleagues (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 
2002) have argued that human cooperation may involve ‘strong reciprocity’. 
This is a combination of altruistic rewarding (i.e. rewarding others for 
cooperative behaviour) and altruistic punishment (imposing sanctions on 
others for non-cooperative behaviour). Whereas reciprocal altruists 
reward and punish only if this is in their (long-term) self-interest, strong 
reciprocators do so even if they gain no benefit whatsoever from their acts. 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) demonstrate that strongly reciprocal indi-
viduals reward and punish in anonymous one-shot interactions but increase 
their rewards and punishments in repeated interactions or when their 
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reputation is at stake. Apparently, they are motivated by a combination of 
altruistic and selfish concerns. ‘Their altruistic motives induce them to 
cooperate and punish in one-shot interactions and their selfish motives 
induce them to increase rewards and punishment in repeated interactions 
or when reputation-building is possible’ (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003: 788; 
see also Fehr and Gächter, 2002). In addition to reciprocal altruism and 
reputation-based cooperation, ‘strong reciprocity’ can explain coopera-
tion in larger groups through the selection of cultural norms favouring 
cooperation, and involving altruistic punishment and reward. As Boyd et al. 
(2003) have demonstrated, strong reciprocity is not a separate mechanism 
for the evolution of cooperation; ultimately the evolution of strong reci-
procity builds on group selection. Both altruistic punishment and altruis-
tic cooperation are maintained in populations engaged in one-time, 
anonymous interactions, thereby allowing for the cultural evolution of 
cooperative behaviour in larger groups.
On the basis of their review of experimental and game-theoretical 
research, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003: 790) conclude that there is ‘fairly 
convincing evidence that cultural forces exert a significant impact on 
human altruism’. One such cultural force might be what has been termed 
‘conformist transmission’ (Boyd and Richerson, 1985), a social learning 
strategy that consists of adopting behaviours that are common (and there-
fore apparently adaptive) among a population; such a strategy may in the 
end lead to cultural group selection, that is the selection of group-beneficial 
norms such as strong reciprocity. Such behaviour sometimes continues to 
be displayed even though it has lost its evolutionary benefits. For instance, 
fear of spiders and snakes is more readily learned than fear of contempo-
rary dangers like automobiles or guns. From an evolutionary point of 
view this has been interpreted as a behavioural ‘mismatch’ (Hagen and 
Hammerstein, 2006).
The paradigm of game-theoretical models of human behaviour has 
recently been criticized by Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) because of the 
highly abstract structure of most experimental economics games and the 
lack of explicit framing or contextualization. Players are given the rules, 
the payoffs, but are deliberately not provided with explicit information 
about the broader context of the game. Are the players friends or com-
petitors, members of one’s in-group or an out-group? Although it is obvi-
ously one of the strengths of experimental research to remain abstract by 
not providing contextual information, this also severely complicates the 
interpretation of the results of such games.
It is time to shift our perspective from players in games and subjects in 
experiments to subjects living in real-life circumstances, having real-life 
motives and purposes. Under what conditions do they display generosity, 
and to what extent does their behaviour resemble that of game-players?
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Generosity in Animals
Reciprocal Altruism among Chimpanzees
Empirical research conducted by primatologist Frans de Waal has demon-
strated that reciprocity and notions of morality, empathy and generosity 
are also present in our closest relatives: chimpanzees. Chimpanzees are 
able to show empathy towards one another, as is for instance shown by 
their stroking and patting a victim of attack or sharing food with a hungry 
companion. They also have the capacity to keep track of what they receive 
and give: they use a kind of ‘moral book-keeping’. In particular grooming, 
food sharing and offering help are subject to rules of reciprocity: if you do 
not groom an individual who has groomed you, then the relationship 
ceases to exist. The same applies to helping: if you do not repay a favour 
received from a certain individual, you will not receive favours yourself 
anymore. Also negative reciprocity has been observed among chimps: an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Chimpanzees have a taste for revenge 
and a sense of justice and fairness which is demonstrated in their ten-
dency to act negatively towards a stingy individual, either by direct or 
indirect retaliation (De Waal, 1996, 2005, 2006).
Reciprocal altruism among chimpanzees is a complex mechanism based 
on the remembrance of favours given and received. It does not merely 
involve the levels of genes and behaviour but also includes emotions and 
psychological considerations. De Waal (1996) summarizes the three main 
characteristics of reciprocal altruism: first, the exchanged acts, while benefi-
cial to the recipient, are costly to the performer; second, there is a time lag 
between giving and receiving (exchange with immediate rewards does not 
count as reciprocal altruism); and third, giving does not necessarily follow 
upon receiving: giving and receiving are contingent. Complex cognitive 
mechanisms are involved; for instance, reciprocal altruism depends on trust 
and requires the punishment of free-riders. It only works if individuals 
regularly meet, have good memories and more or less stable relationships.
De Waal and his co-workers recorded nearly 5000 interactions over 
food among the chimpanzees in the Yerkes zoo in Atlanta (De Waal, 1996). 
Food transfers were analysed in all possible directions among adults. 
Confirming the reciprocity hypothesis, De Waal found that the number of 
transfers in each direction was related to the number in the opposite 
direction. If individual A shared a lot with individual B, the reverse was 
generally also the case; and if individual A shared little with C, this was 
reciprocated by little sharing by C with A. An additional confirmation of 
the reciprocity hypothesis was the finding that grooming affected subse-
quent food sharing. If A had groomed B, A had better chances for getting 
food from B afterwards. Apparently, reciprocity in one area flows over to 
other areas, thereby strengthening the principle.
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So far we have been talking about reciprocal altruism among chimpanzees, 
but to what extent do motives that give rise to strong reciprocity such as 
have been found among humans also produce cooperation in primate 
groups? Silk and her colleagues (Silk, 2005; Silk et al., 2005) conclude on 
the basis of experimental tests with chimpanzees that their cooperative 
behaviour is mainly limited to kin and reciprocating partners, and is 
virtually never extended to unfamiliar individuals. Silk et al. (2005) argue 
that the absence of other-regarding preferences in chimpanzees may indi-
cate that such preferences are tied to the sophisticated capacities of cultural 
learning, perspective taking and moral judgement that are characteristic 
for human beings.
Reciprocal Altruism among Lower Species
Reciprocal altruism is not restricted to ‘higher’ animals such as chimps 
but also occurs, for instance, among vampire bats, birds and dolphins. 
Vampire bats feed at night on the blood of larger animals (Wilkinson, 
1984). Since not every bat is successful in finding a meal, and since with-
out blood bats starve to death within three days, they solve this problem 
by resorting to cooperation. Those who have found blood regurgitate 
blood into the mouths of bats that have not. Recipients of these favours 
return them on subsequent nights to those bats that have helped them in 
the past; and conversely, bats refuse help to those who denied them in the 
past. Like chimpanzees, bats are able to recognize free-riders and to expel 
them from the system. Apparently, bats are able to remember the history 
of their relationships with other bats. When the short-term benefits of 
providing help outweigh the costs to the donor, in the long run a stable 
system of reciprocal altruism will evolve.
Unrelated jackdaws have been found to display high rates of food 
sharing, a behaviour that has been explained as functional for engaging 
in and sustaining social relationships (De Kort et al., 2003). Yet another 
fascinating example of cooperation (or mutualism, as it is mostly called) 
are the ‘cleaner fish’ which live in coral reefs, where they enter the mouths 
of larger ‘client fish’ to remove parasites. Also, dolphins have been 
shown to be reciprocal altruists (Connor and Norris, 1982). They offer 
help to other animals in distress, including human beings, by pressing 
them to the sea surface. The supportive animal usually does not feed 
during this helping act, which can be seen as an additional sacrifice. 
Apparently reciprocal altruism does not only include kin, near relatives 
and non-related same-species individuals but even animals belonging to 
different species.
One can wonder what exactly is reciprocal to this behaviour, since no 
immediate or even delayed acts of reciprocity are apparent. In the course 
of their evolution dolphins have developed a generalized sensitivity for 
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other individuals in distress, irrespective of whether they belong to the 
same or a different species. Regardless of the dolphins’ ‘awareness’ of 
this, their helping behaviour will be rewarded at some point in time, 
either by a same-species individual or by a member of a different species.
In their explanation of this phenomenon biologists point to the fact that 
the evolutionary climate for reciprocal altruism in both humans and dolphins 
was formed in a similar way: strong predatory pressures in the case of 
dolphins and invasion of the savannah in the case of pre-humans resulted 
in highly mutually dependent societies in both cases (Alexander, 1974). It 
is assumed that ‘this marked increase in mutual dependence contributed 
significantly to the evolution of the higher order intelligence . . . by pro-
ducing strong selection pressures for individuals to practice reciprocal 
altruism with greater sophistication’ (Connor and Norris, 1982: 370). As 
long as individuals live in an environment where mutual dependence is 
low and thus are relatively self-reliant, the costs of not participating in 
altruistic exchanges are low; but as mutual dependence increases, the 
costs and the benefits of their interactions with others increase, which 
means in evolutionary terms that interactions have a greater effect on 
their fitness.
This produces strong selection pressures for more sophisticated mecha-
nisms for gaining advantage in reciprocal interactions, which are manifested 
as more complicated emotional systems, better memory and foresight, 
greater learning capacity and the ability to make second order abstrac-
tions, etc. (i.e. many of the components we associate with intelligence) 
(Connor and Norris, 1982: 370).
Here we see the idea frequently expressed in the more recent work of 
Frans de Waal, that moral notions of altruism and generosity have their 
evolutionary origin in a set of learned societal understandings of how to 
behave with respect to fellow individuals. Human emotions, morality and 
generosity have their evolutionary origins in ancient behaviour patterns 
of animals, not only of higher but also of lower animal species.
Human Generosity
Anthropological and Sociological Views
We have seen that the principle of reciprocal altruism is a common occur-
rence among many animal species, and human beings form no exception 
to this principle. A seminal illustration is found in Bronislaw Malinowski’s 
book Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), in which he extensively docu-
mented the ‘principle of give-and-take’. This principle is reflected in the 
Kula, the ceremonial exchange of gifts by the inhabitants of the Trobriand 
Islands near New Guinea. The Kula is a form of exchange on the part of 
the communities inhabiting a wide ring of islands, which form a closed 
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circuit. Along this route, articles of two kinds constantly travel in opposite 
directions. Necklaces move in a clockwise direction, while bracelets move 
in a counter-clockwise direction. After some time, these articles meet arti-
cles of the other class on their way, and are exchanged for them. This 
practice shows that it is not the articles that count, but the principle of 
give-and-take, as Malinowski terms it. One of the main characteristics of 
gifts is that they should be given and reciprocated. Somebody who owns 
something is expected to share it, to pass it on. A gift that does not ‘move’ 
loses its gift properties. If a man keeps a gift too long, he will develop a 
bad reputation and be literally excommunicated.
Various types of motives underlying gift exchange can be distinguished: 
disinterested gifts where no (immediate) returns are expected, more or less 
equivalent reciprocity attended by clear expectations of returns and ‘barter’, 
which is mainly motivated by expected gains. According to Malinowski, 
gifts to kin and partners are more often given disinterestedly, whereas 
more or less direct expectations of returns and elements of barter are more 
characteristic of gifts given to persons farther away in the kinship hierarchy. 
Apparently, the motivation underlying generosity is connected with a 
dimension of genetic (and social) relatedness.
The Kula example illustrates how the continuous circulation of gifts 
keeps the principle of give-and-take alive, thereby helping the community 
to survive. Another example of a gift cycle can be found in Marcel Mauss’s 
description of the habits and traditions of the native tribes in New Zealand, 
the Maori (Mauss, 1990 [1923]). The Maori have a word, hau, which means 
spirit, in particular the spirit of the gift. Returning from the forest where 
they have killed birds, the hunters of these tribes give a part of their game 
to the priests, who cook the birds at a sacred fire. After they have eaten 
some of them the priests have an offering ceremony in which they return 
the hau, in the form of a part of the birds, to the forest where it is supposed 
to produce a new abundance of birds to be killed by the hunters again. 
Like in the Kula, there is a cycle of gift giving: the forest gives its richness 
to the hunters, the hunters give it to the priests and the priests return it to 
the forest. The ceremony performed by the priests is called ‘nourishing 
hau’, feeding the spirit, a literal form of feed-back. The spirit of the gift is 
only kept alive by returning it to where it comes from. By placing the gift 
back in the forest, the priests treat the birds as a gift of nature.
The principle of reciprocity returns in the work of Lévi-Strauss (1996 
[1949]), who argued that this principle is not limited to so-called primitive 
societies, but also applies to western society. He mentions examples in the 
sphere of offering food and the exchange of presents at Christmas. Far 
from being neutral objects without any special symbolic value, gifts are 
‘vehicles and instruments for realities of another order: influence, power, 
sympathy, status, emotion; and the skilful game of exchange consists of a 
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complex totality of maneuvers, conscious or unconscious, in order to gain 
security and to fortify one’s self against risks incurred through alliances 
and rivalry’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1996 [1949]: 76).
Marshall Sahlins (1972) made a distinction between ‘generalized’, 
‘balanced’ and ‘negative’ reciprocity. In generalized reciprocity – the dis-
interested extreme – the expectation of returns is indefinite, and returns 
are not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality. Like Malinowski, Sahlins 
mentions the circle of near kin and loved ones as an example. Balanced 
reciprocity refers to more or less equivalent exchange without much delay 
and is more likely in relationships that are emotionally more distant. 
Negative reciprocity can be seen as the ‘attempt to get something for 
nothing’ (Sahlins, 1972: 195). Sahlins (1972: 196) summarizes his model as 
follows: ‘kindred goes with kindness’, quoting classical anthropologist 
Edward B. Tylor, who was the first to point at the linguistic connection 
between the words ‘kin’ and ‘kindness’ in Indo-European language 
(Tylor, 1958 [1871]).
Sociologists such as Georg Simmel (1950 [1908]) and Alvin Gouldner 
(1973) have come to similar conclusions regarding the role of reciprocity in 
creating and maintaining social ties and community. Simmel considered 
the gift as ‘one of the strongest sociological functions’ without which society 
could not come about. In addition to the norm of reciprocity, Gouldner 
distinguished the ‘norm of beneficence’, or the norm of giving ‘something 
for nothing’: the expression of real altruism; as examples he mentions gifts 
to people in need of care or help, for instance children or frail elderly.
The type of motives underlying gift giving depends on the nature of the 
relationship between giver and recipient, on the level of genetic and/or 
emotional relatedness between them and on the (conscious or unconscious) 
aims of the giver (see Komter, 2005, 2007). The functions and meanings of 
gift exchange are complex and multidimensional – which is why Mauss 
called it a ‘total social phenomenon’. It is exactly this multifunctionality 
and complexity of the gift that enables it to fulfil a stabilizing function in 
the always unpredictable and in principle insecure interaction with other 
human beings.
Generosity and Kin Selection
In order to disentangle the role of biological and social factors in human 
generosity, gift giving within the circle of the family has to be distinguished 
from gift giving in wider circles than the family. Let us start with the family. 
Not only in animal species but also among human beings there are mani-
fold signs of kin selection by means of help and care to close relatives (De 
Waal, 1996; Sahlins, 1972). We help our family and close relatives first, 
while friends, neighbours and strangers only come afterwards. In a Dutch 
empirical research project, we studied giving as well as receiving (Komter 
 at University of Groningen on July 4, 2012iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Komter  Human Generosity
455
and Schuyt, 1993). Our main, and very simple, research question was: 
who gives what to whom, and why? We distinguished between material 
gifts, such as presents and money gifts, and non-material gifts, such as 
giving care or help, offering dinner to people or letting them stay in one’s 
house. A series of questions, derived from this main question, were posed 
as to each type of gift (‘Did you give/receive any gift during . . .?’; ‘To/
from whom did you give/receive this gift?’; ‘What was the occasion?’; 
‘How did you feel about giving/receiving this gift?’, etc.). One of our 
findings was that people with children were less supportive towards their 
friends and wider family than those without children; furthermore, par-
ents and other family members receive more than twice as much help 
than do friends (Komter and Vollebergh, 2002). Apparently, offering care 
or help has a selective character, favouring primary and extended family 
over friends. Bowles and Posel (2005) report similar results: they found 
that genetic relatedness is an important factor in explaining the level of 
remittances from migrant workers to their families.
Acts of generosity are not restricted to close family but can also involve 
friends, neighbours, colleagues and even complete strangers. Charity to 
anonymous beneficiaries is an important area of human generosity 
(e.g. Bremner, 1994; Radley and Kennedy, 1995). However, there is a clear 
hierarchical ordering in gift giving that reveals its evolutionary origins: 
the closer the genetic (and socioemotional) relatedness, the more readily 
generosity will be displayed.
In sum, human generosity is in the first instance oriented towards one’s 
own kin-related group and only afterwards towards non-relatives. 
Behaviour that benefited the fitness of the closest relatives was selected, 
and therefore kin selection has been a primordial factor in the evolution 
of generosity. In the words of Frans de Waal (1996: 214): ‘If altruism 
evolved because of a need to cooperate against hostile forces, solidarity 
with what is close against what is distant is an integral part.’ 
Generosity towards Non-Relatives
We have seen how reciprocity rules the behaviour of grooming chimps. 
Can the same principle be observed among modern western citizens? In 
the previously mentioned research into gift giving in the Netherlands we 
could establish patterns of reciprocity since we examined giving as well 
as receiving. Not only in Malinowski’s and Mauss’s non-western cultures 
but also in our own society the principle of reciprocity proved to be the 
underlying rule of gift giving (Komter, 1996a, 1996b, 2005). Those who 
gave most were the greatest recipients, and those who gave the least were 
also the poorest recipients. Apparently, doing well has its own reward. 
Who are the poorest givers and recipients? Unemployed people appear to 
give less to others than all other categories of respondents, and this holds 
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for all kinds of gifts. The unemployed also appear to receive less than the 
other respondents on all kinds of gifts, except staying at another person’s 
house. Many authors have pointed at the restricted social networks of 
people living on minimum wages or on unemployment benefits. Together 
with their poor financial resources, this might explain the low level of gift 
exchange among the unemployed. For those living on a retirement pension 
the same pattern is revealed as with the unemployed. Except for money 
gifts, retired people give somewhat less to others, compared to the other 
categories of respondents. Retired people, however, also receive less than 
the other categories of all kinds of gifts, except presents; in general, they 
are the lowest recipients of all categories of respondents.
Like with giving to family vs friends, we discovered that certain people 
benefit over others. People seem to choose – probably mostly not in a 
conscious way – those social partners in their gift relationships who are 
‘attractive’ to them, because they can expect them to give in return at 
some time. The principle of reciprocity tends to disadvantage those who 
are already in the weakest social position; in evolutionary terms, the fitness 
of those who engage in reciprocal behaviour is favoured over the fitness 
of those who don’t. However, as we have seen, human beings distinguish 
themselves from non-human primates by having other-regarding prefer-
ences and by showing strong reciprocity: forms of altruism that transcend 
the limitations of genetic or close socioemotional relatedness. In order to 
fully understand human cooperation and generosity we need to broaden 
our perspective to forms of gene-culture co-evolution. We return to bio-
logical studies for illustrations.
Gene-Culture Co-Evolution
There are clear indications that a huge cultural variety exists in the ways 
cooperation and generosity are expressed, not only throughout history 
but also across cultures, as Henrich et al. (2001) have shown. Their behav-
ioural experiments in 15 small-scale societies revealed large variations in 
cooperation, depending on the economic and social conditions existing in 
these societies.
In a recent article, Bowles (2006) discusses archaeological evidence sug-
gesting that intergroup competition in the form of exceptionally lethal 
warfare took place in the late Pleistocene, and that this competition may 
account for the evolution of altruism among early human groups; empir-
ical estimates based on this evidence confirmed his hypothesis. Distinctive 
human practices such as food sharing beyond the immediate family and 
monogamy were crucial to the evolution of altruism, according to Bowles. 
These culturally transmitted practices presuppose advanced cognitive 
and linguistic capacities, that may explain the distinctive forms of altruism, 
other than reciprocal and kin altruism, characteristic of human beings. 
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Apparently, hostility to outsiders and within-group altruism were two 
sides of the same coin, a phenomenon that is still visible in contemporary 
forms of in-group solidarity and out-group hostility (Komter, 2005).
Gintis et al. (2003) assume that strong reciprocity can emerge from recip-
rocal altruism through group selection: when a group is threatened with 
extinction or dispersal, cooperation is most needed for survival. If group 
selection is part of the explanation of the evolution of cooperation by indi-
viduals, then it is likely that group-level characteristics – such as relatively 
small group size, limited migration, or frequent intergroup conflicts – that 
enhance group selection pressures co-evolved with cooperative behaviours. 
The authors argue that group-level characteristics and individual behav-
iours may have synergistic effects, resulting in the construction of institu-
tional environments that limit within-group competition and reduce 
variation within groups. Under the pressure of between-group competi-
tion, costly but in-group-beneficial behaviours can thus co-evolve with 
supporting environments. Based on these assumptions Gintis et al. did a 
series of experimental simulations which indeed revealed the human pre-
disposition to cooperate with unknown others and to punish those who 
violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when no expecta-
tion of repayment of this cost exists. Once again it appears that the evolu-
tionary success of the human species is predicated upon motivations that 
go beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.
‘Ultimate’ and ‘Proximate’ Explanations  
of Generosity
We have seen that human generosity and cooperation involve a wide 
range of explanatory mechanisms depending on the level of genetic and 
socioemotional relatedness and on group size: kinship altruism, direct 
and indirect reciprocity, ‘strong’ reciprocity (involving altruistic rewarding 
and altruistic punishment), group selection, cultural norms and forms of 
gene-culture co-evolution. However, a full insight into the phenomenon 
of generosity is impossible without having a proper understanding of the 
distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations. Whereas ulti-
mate causes are responsible for the evolution of the individual’s responses 
(why does a bird sing?), proximate causes govern the responses of the 
individual to immediate factors explaining the behaviour (how does a bird 
sing?) (see Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963). Proximate causes can involve 
the physiology, biochemistry and psychological and social mechanisms 
underlying behaviour, whereas ultimate explanations highlight the adap-
tive functions for the survival of the organism (see Goldsmith and 
Zimmerman, 2000). As Mayr (1961: 1503) pointed out: ‘causes exist at each 
of these levels; therefore, theories that refer to different levels are not in 
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conflict’. For instance, a proximate explanation for gift giving is that you 
give something to another person because you wish to convey your sym-
pathy or gratitude towards this person; the ultimate explanation is that 
generosity offers selective advantages to those who are able and willing 
to reciprocate, thereby creating social ties and community; both explana-
tions are valid and complement each other.
The distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations is compa-
rable to what other authors have analysed as a distinction between subjec-
tive motives and objective effects (see Bourdieu, 1996 [1977]; see also 
Adloff and Mau, 2005); however, the former distinction has a larger scope 
in the sense that it explicitly refers to the adaptive functionality of behav-
iour for survival and, thus, involves a biological component in addition to 
the social explanation of behaviour.
Since Darwin – the founding father of ultimate explanations – the com-
plementary nature of ultimate and proximate explanations has been gen-
erally recognized by biologists but within social science these different 
types of explanation are often either ignored, or confused. Within socio-
logical and anthropological theory on gifts and generosity, for instance, 
the two levels tend to be confused: gift giving is either seen as generous 
per se, which is a proximate explanation, or as ultimately self-interested, 
stressing its adaptivity for society (Komter, 2005).
Over the last two decades an interesting paradigmatic development 
within contemporary social science is manifesting itself: evolutionary 
approaches, both within psychology and in sociology, are rapidly gaining 
ground. Journals and handbooks adopting an evolutionary stance have 
been published (e.g. Buss, 2005; Dunbar and Barrett, 2007; Lenski, 2005; 
Sanderson, 2001), and the American Sociological Association has a Section 
on Evolution, Biology and Society. However, in social scientific accounts 
of generosity and cooperation the focus still tends to be on proximate 
explanations. For instance, psychologists have explained generosity and 
cooperation by proximate factors such as empathy and trust (see van Vugt 
and van Lange, 2006). Evidence from other disciplines (sociology, anthro-
pology) has emphasized the role of proximate mechanisms of a social 
nature, such as norms of fairness and morality, for regulating exchanges 
between members of groups and bringing solidarity and cooperation 
about. It has been recognized that advanced proximate (cognitive and 
motivational) mechanisms are needed to recognize who is a group member 
and who isn’t, and there is ample empirical evidence from various disci-
plines showing that members of in-groups are favoured over out-group 
members, who are often faced with xenophobia (e.g. De Waal, 1996, 2005; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1986). However, only by taking both proximate and 
ultimate explanations into account can one understand how and why in-
group favouritism and out-group hostility come into existence.
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As Malinowski argued, the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands are 
involved in mutual gift exchange, not only because they feel mutually 
obliged to do so or because they simply like it, but also because the pattern 
of giving and receiving supports a larger system of mutual relationships. 
Chimpanzees do not only groom each other because it feels good but also 
because it is functional for the maintenance of community. Jackdaws 
share food, not only because they want to be nice to each other but also 
because they need to safeguard their social relationships. The same rea-
soning applies to the reciprocal altruism of dolphins and vampire bats. 
Time and again a certain ‘immediate’ behaviour is performed that, though 
often difficult to interpret for human beings, in the end appears to serve 
the ‘fitness’ of the individual or group displaying the behaviour. In most 
cases, reciprocity is not a consciously and rationally pursued strategy. You 
don’t give a gift because you want to get something back at all, but, 
whether you want it or not, you will end up with a return gift, as the 
empirical research in the Netherlands has shown.
While saving lives, not only of kin-related but also of non-related indi-
viduals, can be explained by (extensions of) kinship altruism, also sacrificing 
one’s own life for some ideological belief or conviction can be interpreted 
along evolutionary lines: it will bring benefits to the group because close 
group ties and solidarity are reinforced by it (Komter, 2005; Koopmans, 
2006; Ridley, 1998).
Conclusions
The distinction made by biologists between kinship altruism and reciprocal 
altruism finds an interesting parallel in anthropological and sociological 
research and theory. Insights gained by Malinowski, Sahlins and Gouldner 
converge in their emphasis on the role of the ‘kinship hierarchy’ in gift 
exchange: ‘kindred goes with kindness’. A first conclusion, then, is that 
both biological and anthropological approaches to human generosity 
have demonstrated that generosity is more frequently and more generously 
displayed towards recipients who are genetically and socioemotionally 
related to the giver: kin selection is a quintessential explanation of human 
generosity.
Second, both biological and social scientific research has shed light on 
the important role of reciprocity as a system fostering the evolution of 
generosity. Whether the reciprocity is direct (in dyads or in small groups) 
or indirect (in larger groups), it invariably promotes altruism and coop-
eration, and in doing so serves the survival chances of all parties involved. 
Whereas reciprocity occurs both in higher animals and in human beings, 
and even among lower animal species such as bats and dolphins, there is 
no species in which it is as common, and highly developed as among 
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humans (van Vugt and van Lange, 2006). An interesting similarity between 
the results of computer simulations, on the one hand, and psychological 
and anthropological research, on the other hand, is the role of reputation. 
Whereas research inspired by game theory has shown that giving pays off 
in the long run because in the future the social status of the giver will be 
taken into account, both Malinowski’s field studies and more recent psy-
chological studies reveal that public generosity can act as a ‘signal’ of 
evolutionary fitness. If the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands did not 
pass along their gifts, they would develop a bad reputation and their 
‘fitness’ as recipients of gifts would be reduced.
Not only is kinship altruism selective, reciprocity in human interactions 
has a selective character as well. Human reciprocity needs to be studied 
both in its positive and its negative manifestations; the latter are still too 
often overlooked. Reciprocity not only serves to create social ties and coop-
eration, but also makes ‘victims’ by acting as a ‘principle of exclusion’: 
reciprocity can be seen as a double-edged sword (Komter, 1996b, 2001). 
Those who are generous givers receive amply in return, while those who 
are not in the position to give generously to other people receive very little. 
Generosity generates its own rewards and is therefore selective: those with 
good social opportunities benefit most from mutual gift exchange, whereas 
those who are already lacking in formal resources such as work and 
income are also the least favoured recipients of informal gift giving.
Third, there is no perfect continuity between cooperation and generosity 
among higher primates and human beings: the mechanisms of kinship 
and reciprocal altruism are not sufficient to explain generosity and coop-
eration among humans. Both from biological and social scientific evi-
dence it has become apparent that human beings differ from other social 
species in the sense that they have evolved a unique capacity for generosity 
towards genetic strangers. Human beings cooperate with non-relatives 
and engage in heroic moral behaviour (for instance, saving lives at per-
sonal risk). Mechanisms such as ‘strong reciprocity’, group selection, 
cultural norms and forms of gene-culture co-evolution can account for 
these more complex behaviours.
Finally, in order to solve the apparent contradiction between self- or 
group interest, and altruistic concerns in generosity and cooperation, the 
awareness of the ultimate–proximate distinction among social scientists 
needs to be increased. It is exactly the intricate combination of longer-
term interest (or evolutionary ‘fitness’) and short-term altruism that makes 
generosity such a splendid force in animal and human evolution. In the 
words of the psychologist Ronald Cohen: ‘Because giving is such an adap-
tive feature for the maintenance of social life, it is so ubiquitous among 
human societies’ (Cohen, 1978: 96).
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